Obviously, there were crucial differences between the two postwar eras; to discern parallels is not to claim identities. After the First World War, to cite just a first salient difference, the political Right emerged more militant than before 1914. Fascism drew upon a striking force of veterans inured to violence and contemptuous of civilian virtues. After the Second World War, fascism was discredited and even traditional conservative nationalism rejected. The psychological impact of the fighting did not create nuclei of Arditi, Free Corps recruits, or others addicted to paramilitary violence. For most soldiers the second war impelled instead a search for private fulfillment: "the happy obscurity of a humdrum job and a little wife and a household of kids," according to Bill Mauldin, or, a front away, the return to "the mountains of the Caucasus, the exciting blue smoke of the foothills . . ., the sweet faces of loved ones."5 What analogue existed after 1945 to the trincetsmo, the glorification of the trenches of World War I, was the partisans' mountain ordeal: a trial that Resistance spokesmen claimed was moral justification for a new elite, although without any encouragement for a continuing cult of violence. Indeed, the distinction in 1914-18 between front soldiers mired down in brutalizing combat and male civilians at home who sometimes enjoyed cushy, protective berths-the so-called embusques or imboscati-dissolved in 1939-45 with the rapid movement of troops, the air attacks on civilian targets, and the hardships of occupation. Almost 50 percent of Europe's dead in the second war were civilians, compared to about 5 percent in the first. Only in retrospect is it discernible that even under the collaborationist regimes conservative elements had to rethink the economic role of the state and the future relationship of capital and labor. To cite just the French situation (although analogues existed in the Netherlands and the Salo Republic), awareness that the Vichy regime was doomed and mass upheaval likely prompted the industrialists summoned by the Conseil Superieur de l'1tconomie Industrielle et Commerciale to search for a "factory community" that would provide a "balanced solution" between "yesterday's capitalism" and "collectivism." Such explorations, however, could build upon more than fear of postwar revolution. They carried forward some of the heterodox notions of economic planning that dissenting socialists and conservative intellectuals alike had outlined in the 1930s.8
A major condition for a more flexible Right was the fact that the Left too debarked differently after the second war. Between 1918 and 1921 the European working classes had first surged into spontaneous demonstrations, had then waged long, disciplined mass strikes, and had finally retrenched in frustration and divided. Much of their insurrection followed from the intensified labor discipline the war imposed as well as progressive ideological alienation from its national objectives. The second war imposed some of the same ordeals within the factory, but the German occupation made the factory a less central source of oppression. The heirs of the working-class leadership that had come to oppose the first war by 1917 urged active resistance to the Germans after June 1941, so that the second war was less an alien upper-class cause than an arduous wait for liberation. Its conclusion thus brought a different tempo of working-class cooperation and protest. Western Communists played down any radical economic transformation that outran the broad Resistance consensus on purges and the nationalization of key industries or those tainted by their owners' collaboration. Instead Communist leaders stressed anti-Nazi unity (until the final defeat of Germany) and continuing production, even at the cost of harsh industrial discipline. "The bonus per ton is evil," wrote one CGT leader in March 1945 about detested pay differentials, "but coal is necessary." Maurice Thorez insisted to coal miners at Waziers in July 1945 that production itself was a demonstration of solidarity, militancy, and working-class power.9 "Only by working, only by working hard will we be able to overcome this situation [ socialize poverty?" Communists, warned Jacques Duclos, as he condemned the 1946 Socialist-supported strikes of French civil servants, had to demonstrate "that democracy is a regime of order, a regime of tranquility and of work."'"
The open question in France, Belgium, and Italy (to the extent that the Anglo-American occupation would have permitted) was whether an angry and long-repressed working class would explode in a spontaneous radicalism with plant seizures, local "socialization," and summary trials. Communist pressure for carrying through purge procedures probably helped contain grass-roots grievances. In fact, whether in France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, or Bavaria (under American auspices), the purges became more and more restricted. Categories of guilt seemed to blur hopelessly, and moderates came to grasp that trying business leaders for cooperation with the Germans could have radical consequences, or, in the words of one Esprit intellectual who advocated it, "The purge of the economic sector entails overturning all property relations."" Purges were thus wound down short of any major upheaval, and the emphasis upon sifting individuals probably diverted effort from institutional transformationalthough originally the Left had envisaged kpuration as a mode of collective change.
Perhaps, however, the major force for preventing ideological polarization af- In short, the relative strength of the Left in the respective postwar periods depended to a great extent upon the particular national situation. The programs of the Left, however, often remained a less clearcut challenge after 1944 than they were after 1918. They aspired less to overturn bureaucratic and economic control than to attain public ownership of key industries. By 1945, however, ownership was a less crucial issue than earlier for many sectors that the Left targeted for nationalization. The earlier socialist challenge that followed in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution with its innovation of soviets was probably more fundamental. What the participants in the massive strikes and insurrections of 1918-21, the militants at party and union congresses, and the remarkable socialist theorists of the early 1920s urged in aggregate was not merely the centralization of important industries in the hands of the state; this demand came from moderate Social Democrats. Instead, they criticized managerial control of the workplace and of production regardless of ownership; and, by extension, they challenged the chains of command of the Western economies from top to bottom.
These movements failed in the West for many reasons. They were rooted in the shop steward organizations of the Clydeside, the factory grievance committees established during the war to smooth labor relations, which in turn helped generate the consigli di fabbrica of Turin and the Rate in Germany and Austria. Some spokesmen for these councils envisioned a syndical reorganization of the economy and politics. But often their militancy derived from the more conservative impulses of defending the work skills and artisanal independence still conserved under factory roofs against degrading standardization of tasks and wartime "dilution" (the hiring of unskilled replacements, sometimes women).'5 Moreover, the councils comprised a strong movement only in a few industrial regions, and their revolts exploded out of phase with each other. The movement, moreover, appears to have evoked the least resonance in France, which would still have had to be the keystone of any general West European transformation. In France, reformist socialists as well as industrial leaders restricted the mandate of factory delegates, while after the armistice radicals spilled into street demonstrations that were militant but diffuse and finally settled on a program for nationalization of the railroads."6 Likewise in Britain, Labour militants came to focus upon takeover of the coal industry. In Germany, the councils emerged during revolution but often just to take charge of factories, Still, given the limitations of the movement, the council episodes suggested that bourgeois concepts of rational economic and political authority were all terribly vulnerable. The dramas staged at Fiat or Renault or the mines of Essen were frightening not primarily because they may have attained an ephemeral success but because they suggested that only force, not consensus, stood in the way of a collectivist alternative. At stake, therefore, was bourgeois legitimacy as well as naked control. Bourgeois response, thus, had to go beyond mere repression. Counterstrategies had to operate on plant and national planes, micro-and macro-levels simultaneously. The need to reassert authority within the factory gave renewed impetus to plans for scientific management, which would further centralize factory authority by differentiating tasks "down to the tiniest detail," as some French sponsors defined their Taylorite efforts. 19 Acceptance of this technocratic functionalism required conservative flexibility, and business as well as political milieux divided between progressives and reactionaries. The reactionaries distrusted industry-wide organization and insisted on the prerogatives of ownership, asserting what the Germans called their Herr-im-Hause domination. But the more fruitful approach was to build upon the potential for cooptation that wartime labor-management agreements and the unavowed brotherhood of wage-price spirals had encouraged after 1914.20 As might be expected, the industrial "progressives" were less fixated on ownership, more concerned with managerial expertise; they were multi-divisional foxes rather than single-factory lions. Building upon his wartime organizational efforts, Walther Rathenau forcefully defended entrepreneurial leadership, while outlining complex schemes for capitalist self-government and planning. 1920s derived from the important interindustry associations-less businessmen than their organizers and lobbyists: FranSois Poncet of the Comite des Forges with his sleek defense of technocratic inequality; Gino Olivetti of Confindustria, who from even before the war was to emphasize that only the industrialist could "technically order the factory according to a pre-established plan"; his successor Antonio Benni, who insisted that industry was "not personified by the capitalist or the stockholder but by its directors, by its chiefs, and by the organizers of the enterprise."22 Industry, moreover, became the paradigm for political society in general, as, for instance, when Ernest Mercier sought to rally managerial expertise in the above-party Redressment FranSais or Alfred Mond organized the Mond-Turner talks with trade-union leaders in the wake of the British General Strike.
These initiatives and self-justifying notions were hardly widespread enough to reorder industrial organization, any more than the council movement had revolutionized the workplace. Nonetheless, celebrators and critics alike felt that scientific management represented a decisive economic and social breakthrough,23 and the economic circumstances of the late 1920s powerfully reinforced this new legitimation of capitalism. The stabilization of currencies on the gold-exchange standard, renewal of intense international competition, and concern about saturation of home markets all made "rationalization" more urgent. Rationalization was a concept that comprised market-sharing agreements across frontiers and within domestic economies plus parallel efforts to lower the burden of wages and other costs through investment, technical improvements, and mergers. At the same time industrial leaders sought legitimation for their power, whether it derived from the right to lay off workers in a cyclical downturn or from their collaboration with an authoritarian regime as in Italy. The managerial mystique evoked widespread enthusiasm, assumed a truly cultic importance precisely because it was a modern and supposedly class-neutral alternative to the immediately preceding socialist attack on industrial hierarchies. The Left never again challenged the premise that production was a question for managers and engineers with the same vigor that they had immediately after the first war. Even when the close of World War II seemed to offer renewed opportunity, plans to reorganize the factory and control production remained relatively undeveloped. In France, workers revolted against the coerciveness of the Occupation and sought to oust patrons they identified as both collaborators and exploiters. But their efforts yielded only limited success, and the bitterness of the later strikes in 1947 and 1948 testified to the frustration of aspirations raised at the Liberation. The Communists did support new schemes for a workers' voice in the tripartite management boards (representing management, labor, and the state) for the nationalized industries, urged by Minister of Industry Marcel Paul. But they had to retreat in the face of MRP and Socialist countermeasures to ensure a more technical supervision; nor was it clear that the PC had really wanted more than its own industrial barony.26 Italian workers were perhaps most consistent in reviving factory representation through the consigli di gestione. Communist spokesmen, however, came to define these councils as a structure for giving the workers a stake in production. They were not intended to replicate Gramsci's revolutionary factory councils.27 And, in Germany, while co-determination as sought in the mining and metal industries may well have represented a creative and innovative demand, it still remained an effort more to share in the control of traditional managerial functions rather than to overthrow them. The left-wing SPD spokesman Viktor Agartz developed the most two constraints together allowed each to be resolved in its own right. Only securing the two simultaneously, moreover, was likely to reconcile the major organized interest groups of the European economies.
Reading backward, one can say, of course, that the 1930s did not find the warranted growth path; and the original statements of the difficulty reflected the somber outcome in their pessimistic depiction of a "knife edge" that a dynamic economy had to tread if it was not to falter. Later theory, perhaps reflecting the generation of post-1950 growth, has suggested that in fact equilibrium growth is relatively easy to generate: technological substitutions, public spending, population growth, and income redistribution have all been shown to make ascent of the knife edge far less chancy.3" Indeed, the dilemma of equilibrium growth at the end of the 1920s was in part self-imposed by the reigning preoccupation with capital shortages and by the brakes placed on national income growth by the neomercantilist policies of the years following currency stabilization. There were dissenters to prevailing policy, such as John Maynard Keynes. But Keynes remained a gadfly and not always consistent in his recommendations. By the 1930s Keynes and like-minded adherents of purchasing-power doctrines pointed to the state as the agency that could assure high aggregate demand. Their intellectual task became simplified when they urged that their societies more or less disconnect from the international market and seek higher employment levels autarkically-that is, that they cease to fret about exchange rates. Indeed, abandonment of old currency parities followed almost by force majeur after 1931. In the long run, Keynes also felt, capital accumulation should become a less preoccupying task, for capital would become more plentiful in relation to the need for it.32
Today these simplifying premises appear more problematic. Indeed, contemporary Western economic dilemmas suggest partial parallels with the difficulties perceived at the end of the 1920s. United States economic concepts for the postwar international economy largely precluded the welfare-state self-sufficiency that Keynes suggested. This meant further that his vision of satiated investment needs, with its resultant "euthanasia of the rentier," was likewise premature. Industrial societies in a world market arena can hardly allow investment to atrophy without losing real income to new competitors. Even to apply Keynesian macroeconomic stimulus to assure full employment may bring deteriorating balances of trade and, if no foreign subsidies are found, declining welfare. Some of the constraints that vexed the 1920s have thus re-emerged and, with them, the distributive conflicts between the interests of wage earners and the spokesmen for capital. The difference is that, in the 1920s, the difficulties were rooted in too limited a confidence in mass consumption as a force for growth, whereas in the 1970s they may have derived from too excessive a reliance.
What remains historically remarkable is that from the late 1940s into the 1970s the constraints of the interwar period eased as a twin reorientation took place. First, the United States developed a commitment to European prosperity; second, the political and economic calculations of Europeans themselves changed so that they felt less locked into a distributive contest. Both changes together eased the iron framework of wages, profits, state claims, and international payments.33
How could this reorientation take place so easily after 1945? For one thing, it was silently underway before that date. As an explicit principle of consensus, economic growth-the notion of continuously higher levels of national product-came into its own at the end of the 1940s. The earliest public celebration of its virtues may well have been Leon Keyserling's speeches as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers during 1949;47 but the less precise concepts of sustained high purchasing power or simply "creconstruction" or "production" served to rally labor as well as businessmen from the end of the war on.
Throughout 1945 trade and welfare, but thereby reward the most massive and technologically productive economy, or whether as the British desired, it should be based upon regional systems of dominion that guaranteed international markets to the weaker power.57 Still, the British dominion alternative seemed to be a limited challenge, whereas the German threat to the open international economy had been more ominous and, just as critical, the emanation of an ugly political regime. This is not to argue that Nazism was menacing because of its international economic policies-the autarky and bilateralism that so angered Cordell Hull. Instead, the connection between politics and economics was central to the very way Nazism was interpreted as a regime. American commentators viewed Nazism as an abusive political economy: a cartel of monopolists who subordinated the public sphere to private forces.") Although Hjalmar Schacht's bilateral treaties yoked Eastern Europe into a German-dominated economic bloc, trade access to this area was hardly a crucial stake in itself. Nevertheless, a Germany that was enrolled in a system of international exchange with the West, as the Weimar Republic had been from 1924 to the Depression,'59 naturally appeared a safer and more decent participant in a liberal international order.
Hence the central conflict defining the international political ecoriomy from World War I until about 1950 was not that between American and Soviet alternatives, between capitalism and communism. The Soviet-American antagonism after World War II, in effect, imposed a framework on international politics but did not exhaust the issues. Viewed over the whole half century, the American international economic effort of the era of stabilization centered on overcoming British, Japanese, and especially German alternatives to a pluralist, niarket-economy liberalism. In the case of Germany, these alternatives were incorporated first in Berlin's vision of Mitteleuropa during Ludendorff's regime of 1917-18 and then in Hitler's expansionist Reich. Defeating these German projects, however, could be only the first stage in erecting a stable alternative. To assure liberal, pluralist stability within each West European country, as well as for the Atlantic region as a whole, required the further step of integrating German economic dynamism into an international system of exchange: perhaps the pre-eminent Western diplomatic task in each postwar reconstruction period.
These respective postwar tasks, however, took more than just German defeat; they also required that the United States assume the burden of funding Germany's international deficits-including reparations-after the two wars. Amer- accomplishment because the costs were so distressing. Certainly this essay should not be read as an argument that, because stability resulted, the intervening tyranny, warfare, sacrifice, and resistance lose their historical significance. Still, to ask about significance is to search for meaning, which is just one task of history. To trace the structural principles of collective life must remain an equally valid historical enterprise; and that pursuit compels us to admit that even catastrophic events do not always durably alter the trajectory of institutions any more than the constant slow renewal that procedes in the absence of disaster. Indeed, that continuing change best facilitates the analysis of earlier patterns. If now the institutional solutions of the second postwar era show signs of wear and tear, if the social compromises of the welfare state become precarious as economic growth falters, if the stability of the past generation appears perhaps to have rested on exceptional and transitory advantages, such as the consensus on postwar reconstruction or the ease of securing resources from outside Europe, then we can better begin to understand the recent era not merely as events but as history.
